Repairs to the carrier USS Hornet

The repair ships of WWII were fully equipped to address almost every kind of damage or make nearly every other kind of repair that a vessel might need. In the Pacific, these unique ships, stationed at advanced bases in combat zones, provided maintenance and support to warships of all kinds including landing craft, destroyers, submarines, seaplanes, battleships, and aircraft carriers. My dad, Frank Dolan, who had previously served on another repair ship, the USS Vestal, was also a weldor on the repair ship Hector, now stationed at Eniwetok.

On today's date in 1944, the aircraft carrier, USS Hornet (CV-12),* received catapult repairs from Hector's crews at Eniwetok in the Marshall Islands. Hector had to complete significant work on the ram and piston in order to put the catapult in operation. As a weldor, Dad probably would not have worked on this project, but it does illustrate the varied tasks that confronted a repair ship like Hector.

USS Hornet, October  27,1945
Source: Wikipedia Commons

The USS Hornet was commissioned in November 1943, and it quickly played a major part in the war in the Pacific. She spent weeks providing intensive air strikes in the Marianas Islands, including Saipan, Guam, and Tinian. On June 19, 1944, she participated in the decisive Naval Battle of the Philippine Sea. Her fighter pilots sank the Japanese carrier Shokaku and damaged another carrier and cruiser. They also shot down 52 Japanese planes in the famed "Marianas Turkey Shoot."

That same year, from its base at Eniwetok, Hornet attacked the enemy from Guam to the Bonin Islands south of Japan. Then it was on to the Palaus, the Philippine Sea, and to enemy bases on Okinawa and Formosa. Hornet's aircraft supported the invasion force at the Battle of Leyte, October 20. During the Naval Battle for Leyte Gulf, October 23-26, she launched raids against the Japanese in the Battle off Samar, the center-most action in the Battle of Leyte and hastened the retreat of the Japanese fleet.

Through the remainder of 1944, Hornet attacked enemy shipping and airfields throughout the Philippines, including participating in a raid that destroyed an entire Japanese convoy in Ormoc Bay. On December 30, 1944, she departed Ulithi in the Carolines for raids against Formosa, Indochina, and the Pescadores Islands. 

In 1945 Hornet left Ulithi for full-scale aerial assaults on Tokyo, then supported the amphibious landing on Iwo Jima, February 19-20. Her planes next supported the amphibious assault on Okinawa on April 1. A few days later, her fighters joined in attacks which sank the Japanese battleship Yamato near Okinawa. For another couple of months, Hornet provided support to ground troops on Okinawa and raided the industrial capacity of Japan. In almost continuous action for 16 months, Hornet was never hit by enemy fire. But from June 4-5, 1945, the carrier was caught in a typhoon, which collapsed a large section of her forward flight deck. She was forced to return to the states for major repairs. She was returned to service in September 1945, in time to bring home victorious American troops.

USS Hornet. Collapsed flight deck, June 1944
Source: NavSource.com

Unlike many of her sister warships, Hornet saw lengthy service after WWII. She next served in the Korean War and then Vietnam. She also had a role in the Apollo space program recovering manned and unmanned spaceships. In 1969, she recovered the Apollo 11 astronauts after their return from the first moon landing, and then she recovered the crew of Apollo 12 later that year.

Hornet was decommissioned in June 1970 and finally struck from the naval register in 1989. In contrast to so many other WWII warships, Hornet was spared scrapping, and in 1991 was designated a National Historic Landmark. She is now preserved as the USS Hornet Museum in Alameda, California.

For her extraordinary WWII combat record, USS Hornet earned 9 battle stars.

*The previous ship of this name was the USS Hornet (CV-8), the carrier that launched the B-25s in the Doolittle Raid over Japan in April 1942. It was destroyed in the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands, October 1942.

Sources: USS Hector AR7- Ship’s Log (WWII); Naval History and Heritage Command; US Carriers

The Navy's worst aircraft accident

On today's date in 1944, one of the U.S. Navy's worst aircraft disasters occurred on the forward operating base at Eniwetok Atoll. And it occurred not far from where my dad's repair ship, USS Hector, was anchored in the lagoon.

Almost immediately after Eniwetok was taken from the Japanese in February 1944, Navy Seabees began construction of a bomber airstrip on the main southern island. Completed on March 11, the field, had 2 taxiways, facilities for major engine overhaul, and housing for aviation personnel in Quonset huts.  They also created coral-filled piers had been constructed for mooring tankers. Two beaches were developed for Tank Landing Craft. They built small boat repair shops and a floating dock for small ships. In addition to an airport, the airbase also was used for holding reserve carrier aircraft and for receiving and storing aviation fuel.

Named in honor of Navy pilot Lt. John H. Stickell, who was killed in the Marshall Islands, the field was often used by B-24s and B-25s on missions to bomb Truk and Ponape Islands and other targets. From Eniwetok, the Marshall Islands were dominated by air. B-24s were also able to make 13-hour flights to provide photo reconnaissance of Saipan.

Stickell Field, Eniwetok Island

At this point in the war resources and aircraft were being pushed to their limits. It was considered normal for advanced naval airfields, like Stickell, to stockpile necessary materiel toward defeating Japan. So it was expected that Eniwetok Island—only 2 miles long and a quarter-mile wide—would be crammed with aircraft and everything it took to support them. It was also common practice for planes to exceed the maximum gross weight at takeoff. These factors led to the inevitable disaster that occurred on this date.

U.S. Navy PB4Y-1 Liberator bomber at Kwajalein, Jan-Feb 1944
Source: WWII Database

The tragic accident happened in the evening of August 9. As an overloaded Navy patrol aircraft, PB4Y-1 (a Navy version of the B-24 "Liberator"), was lifting off, it drifted and crashed into parked carrier planes that crowded the edges of the runway. Crashing through the row of parked planes, the PB4Y-1 finally came to rest at the end of the strip. There it burst into flames. The fire quickly spread to the parked aircraft, and then its nine 500-pound bombs began to explode. The explosions ignited the aircraft's fuel and detonated its .50 caliber ammunition. The raging fire continued for 2 hours before brave firefighters brought it under control. 106 planes were damaged or destroyed. Amazingly only 9 men were killed in the inferno, all members of the 11-man crew of the PB4Y-1.

The accident on Eniwetok was the greatest loss of aircraft due to a single plane crash in naval history. Many factors contributed to the accident. But, unquestionably, the necessary demands of war and wartime conditions were significant factors. The build-up on Eniwetok was essential for the final assault on the Japanese homeland. While recommendations were made to preclude another disaster of this magnitude, war operations on Eniwetok continued. Stickell airfield and the entire Eniwetok Atoll continued serve as an enormous and strategic base for operations against Japanese-held territory.

Sources: Building the Navy's Bases in World War II;  "Normal Requirement": The Navy's Worst Ever Aircraft Accident, David Trojan

The Battle of Atlanta at 150

Having fought in 2 battles over the past couple of days, Lt. Gen. William Hardee's Corps, including Maj. Gen. Patrick Cleburne's Division, in which Great Grandfather Nathan Oakes was serving in the 32nd Mississippi Infantry, was called back to Atlanta, arriving there before midnight on July 21, 1864. The division was ordered here to ready for yet another attack on the Federal line.

Now within the city's fortifications, Cleburne’s men had a short rest while he met with Hardee for new orders. Cleburne learned that the army's commander, Lt. Gen. John Bell Hood, planned for Hardee to lead his corps on a lengthy and circuitous march east of the city to launch a surprise attack against the left and rear of Maj. Gen. James B. McPherson’s army approaching from Decatur. As Hood envisioned it, Hardee would strike at dawn and would "roll up" the south of the Federal line and drive it in confusion into the center. Then Gen. Benjamin F. Cheatham’s (Hood's old corps) and Alexander P. Stewart's Corps would follow up with a final strike on the front and drive the enemy back to the Chattahoochee River.

The fate of Atlanta would rely on the outcome of this attack. But Hood's plan was doomed to failure.

Hood was relying on exhausted men who had not slept for 2 days and had seen near-constant marching and fighting. It was unrealistic for him to require these men to make a 15-mile night march through a panicked and crowded city, before launching a dawn attack. Hardee objected, so Hood agreed that instead of striking the Federal rear, he could turn north at a moment of his choosing and hit the enemy flank.

Source: Historical Markers Across Georgia

After midnight on today's date in 1864, Hardee's Corps, accompanied by Maj. Gen. Joseph Wheeler's cavalry, stretching several miles long, marched all night under a bright full moon, south on the McDonough Road, then southeast, and finally northeast toward Decatur. About an hour before dawn, they halted near William Cobb’s Mill, 3 miles from McPherson's line, where the men got a couple of hours’ rest by the side of the road. Each man was issued an additional 20 rounds of ammunition in preparation to move northward toward the enemy's line.

After meeting with Gens. W.H.T. Walker and Joseph Wheeler to discuss the attack, Cleburne and Hardee decided they could delay no longer. About a mile beyond Cobb's Mill on the Fayetteville Road, Hardee split his corps. He sent the troops on another 2 miles toward the Federal line. Gens. William Bate's and Walker's Divisions would continue northwestward to Sugar Creek, then face left and move against the presumed Federal flank. Cleburne and Brig. Gen. George Maney (commanding Cheatham's Division)¹ would move northward along the east side of Flat Shoals Road. Maney, traveling on the east side of the road would attack the center. Cleburne on the west side of the road would deploy on Walker’s left and flank the enemy, attacking in the rear.

With the exception of that short rest by the side of the road, Cleburne’s men had now marched or fought continuously for 48 hours. They would be assaulting the south flank of the forces they had resisted all the previous day.

Photo by Mark Dolan, June 2010

Cleburne's Division, with Mark Lowrey's Brigade, Great Grandfather's, trailing 500 years behind, encountered rough terrain on its march along Flat Shoals. The division was not in position until nearly midday, so Cleburne's attack came a little later than Walker's and Bate's, who were east of him about a mile away. Cleburne deployed his 3 brigades just to the west of Flat Shoals Road, with Brig. Gens. Daniel Govan's Brigade on the left of the division and James A. Smith's (Polk's) Brigade on the right. He placed Lowrey's Brigade 500 yards behind in a second line as a reserve.

At 12:45 PM, Cleburne gave the command, and the men moved forward. Very soon, the dense woods and thick underbrush broke up the attack formation. Lowrey's Brigade, and probably the others, too,  were forced into a column, 4-men wide, until about a mile forward Cleburne called a halt so his brigade commanders could correct their alignment. This consumed valuable time before the advance resumed.

Cleburne's men struck the left flank of McPherson's army where its line bent eastward in a fishhook of fortified works, beyond which a division was posted on a round hill, known locally as "Bald Hill," from which the Confederates had been forced the day before. Govan’s Brigade was first of the division to meet the enemy, and after a 20-minute struggle, drove its skirmishers back to a line of breastworks, which his men eventually captured along with an entire regiment. His brigade took severe casualties for the effort.

Photo by Mark Dolan, June 2010

Gen. McPherson's monument marking the spot where he was killed.
Location is present day Monument & McPherson Avenues. His body
was removed and buried in the McPherson Cemetery in Clyde, Ohio.

On Govan’s right, Smith’s Brigade caught the enemy by surprise, and his men pursued the fleeing Federals. Rebel troops met face-to-face with a mounted Federal officer on the wrong side of his line, who was clearly startled to see them. Refusing to sur-render as ordered, and touching his hat in salute, he attempted to gallop off. However the soldiers opened fire, mortally wounding the commander of the Army of the Tennessee, Gen. James Birdseye McPherson, the only Union army commander to be killed during the war.² Smith's and some of Govan's men then forced the enemy back to their defenses on the hill.

To this point, it seemed that the attack was going according to Hood's plan. But by 2 PM, the heat, lack of sleep, and exhaustion, began to take a toll on the Confederates, and their ranks were thinning.

About 2 hours into the battle, Smith had encountered another line of formidable Federal works, so sent a request for support. Lowrey then was ordered to move up his brigade, which had been held in reserve behind Govan's men, and to storm the enemy breastworks. Lowrey marched his troops eastward through deep woods, which he couldn't see through more than 100 yards, and came into the fight on Govan’s right wing. Here, Lowrey reported, his thin line "rushed forward with great impetuosity, as though they bade defiance to Yankee breast-works." Many of his officers were cut down or captured at this point of the attack.

Meanwhile, the fight on Govan’s front continued. Cleburne ordered his artillery to advance with the infantry, and ordered Capt. Thomas J. Key to bring his battery up to within 200 yards of the Federal line. The Federals wavered under Key's fire, and when Granbury’s Regiment came in on their left, the troops fled. Key reported to Cleburne and Govan who were watching the fight that the Federals were falling fall back to Bald Hill which, because of its height, dominated the battlefield and became vital to the outcome of the fight.

From the base of Bald Hill, Cleburne renewed the attack on a third line of Yankee breastworks positioned on the crown of the Federal line. But this time the Yankees didn’t run. Instead, they fought off Cleburne's renewed assault. About 4 PM, Lowrey’s shattered brigade added its force to this attack, while Maney/Cheatham's Division came into the fight on Cleburne’s left. Despite their exhaustion, the Rebels made a furious and magnificent charge across 40 yards of open ground. Many of Lowrey's men were cut down, but the rest plunged on into the enemy. A hand-to-hand struggle ensued.

The enemy was just as determined as Lowrey's men. After 45 minutes of savage fighting, the Federals drove back their attackers. Though some of the of the Confederates gained a temporary hold, night closed with the Federals still in possession of Bald Hill. Cleburne’s men fell back to the second line of Federal entrenchments, which they had captured earlier, and there dug in. What was left of Lowrey’s Brigade withdrew with the division into the dense woods and out of range of enemy fire.

Captured Confederate entrenchments, Atlanta 1864
From the Matthew Brady Collection

Concerning this charge on Bald Hill, Gen. Lowrey recalled that his brigade was "cut to pieces, losing half its number." According to Mississippi historian, Dunbar Rowland, the 32nd Mississippi Infantry, in which Great Grandfather Nathan Oakes was fighting in Co. D, "had to cross a miry glade and advance through the remnants of [Smith's Brigade], that had been repulsed." Lowrey reported, "The Thirty-second Mississippi rushed forward almost to the works, when one-third of the command fell at one volley and two color bearers were killed in quick succession." He continues:

All the regiments acted well. Taking the brigade all together, I never saw a greater display of gallantry; but they failed to take the works simply because the thing attempted was impossible for a think line of exhausted men to accomplish. It was a direct attack by exhausted men against double their number behind strong breast-works. The history of this war can show no instance of success under such circumstances.

Lowrey said that he lost about one-half the men in his brigade in that charge: Col. W. H. H. Tison was wounded and 578 men were either killed, wounded, or captured. "Many of the captured," he wrote, "were first wounded, but some charged over the breast-works and were captured, while others went to the works and could not get away."

Confederate entrenchments, possibly looking east toward Bald Hill, 1864
From the Matthew Brady Collection

In that assault, the 32nd Regiment lost 18 in killed, 45 wounded, and 23 missing. It is possible that in this fight Acting Lieutenant Colonel of the 32nd Mississippi Regiment, Capt. Flemming S. Norman, was killed. Norman was the captain of Great Grandfather Nathan Oakes's Co. D³ since its formation in Corinth, Mississippi in 1861. Norman, and many of his men, including my great grandfather, were from the tiny community of Boneyard and neighboring Kossuth, Mississippi, the same town where Lowrey pastored a church prior to the war. Capt. Norman's death hit even closer to home for Great Grandfather Oakes, for Norman was also his uncle.⁴ Also, Lieut. B.F. Dilworth from his hometown was killed while leading Co. D in this attack, as were many others. In fact, every company in the 32nd Mississippi had captains and/or officers who were killed, wounded, captured, or missing.

Around 5 PM, Cleburne personally led Govan's and Smith's Brigades, Maney's/Cheatham's Division, and Mercer's Brigade, in an another attack, this time along Flat Shoals Road and Bald Hill. The Confederates captured a line of works and forced the Federal line on the crest of the hill to retire east of its original position. To the east of this fighting, other Confederate units attacked the Federal line, but without success.

Photo by Mark Dolan, June 2010

Gen. Hardee later reported that the battle was "one of the most desperate and bloody of the war, and... won the only decided success achieved by the army at Atlanta." Indeed, his corps suffered severely receiving 3,300 casualties. The partial success of Cleburne’s Division on Bald Hill on this date was the high point of the Confederate assault. However it was largely in vain. On his right, Bate and Walker had been slowed by difficult terrain and suffered a repulse. Walker had been shot dead before the attack was barely under way.⁵ Cheat-ham’s Corps was not ordered into the fight until late afternoon, after Cleburne’s attack was losing its momentum. Hood had delayed ordering Cheatham forward in the hope that Hardee’s assault would drive the Federals north of Decatur Road, in which event Cheatham’s attack would have proved decisive. But Hood unleashed Cheatham's force too late in the day. While the men fought furiously, the attack was halted. A Federal counterattack restored the enemy's line.

Despite the heroic sacrifices of his soldiers, and even Hardee's success in inflicting heavy losses on the enemy, Hood's goal of a coordinated attack to drive McPherson's army back to the Chattahoochee was not achieved.

That night, Cleburne’s Division improved their new defenses and prepared to defend the ground they had won. There was little firing overnight, so for the first time in 48 hours, Cleburne’s men were able to grab some sleep. When the sun came up on the 23rd, both armies remained in place, unwilling to renew the fight. At midnight, they agreed on an armistice to remove the dead and wounded from between the lines.

The Army of Tennessee, with Cleburne’s and Maney’s support, had managed to carry the left wing of the Federal army to its breastworks. As evidence of its progress in its sector, Cleburne’s men captured 1,600 prisoners, numerous wagons, ammunition, artillery, mules and horses, hundreds of small-arms, 8 pieces of artillery, and 4 stand of colors. In spite of this, the battle for the Confederates ended indecisively.⁶ It failed to halt Gen. William T. Sherman’s tightening siege on Atlanta. It also resulted in many more Confederate casualties than the army could afford. Confederate losses numbered upwards to 5,000. By contrast, the Federals lost about 3,600 men. Among the Confederate's loss were 1,388 from Cleburne's Division—more than half of those engaged in the battle.

Atlanta will soon fall to Sherman's victorious army. Sherman's successful conclusion to his Atlanta Campaign will boost President Abraham Lincoln's bid for re-election, assuring that he will retain the presidency until the eve of the Confederacy's defeat in 1865.

¹ Brig. Gen. George Maney commanded Cheatham's Division, while Cheatham led Hood's Corps at Peachtree Creek and the Battle of Atlanta.

² Gen. McPherson's death was mourned by officers on both sides. In fact, Confederate Gen. Hood, who had been McPherson's roommate at West Point, wrote,

I will record the death of my classmate and boyhood friend, General James B. McPherson, the announcement of which caused me sincere sorrow. Since we had graduated in 1853, and had each been ordered off on duty in different directions, it has not been our fortune to meet. Neither the years nor the difference of sentiment that had led us to range ourselves on opposite sides in the war had lessened my friendship; indeed the attachment formed in early youth was strengthened by my admiration and gratitude for his conduct toward our people in the vicinity of Vicksburg. His considerate and kind treatment of them stood in bright contrast to the course pursued by many Federal officers.

³ Dunbar Rowland incorrectly indicated that Norman was captain of Co. "G" rather than Co. D.
⁴ Capt. Norman had a brother, Pvt. Lafayette Norman, fighting in this same battle in the 33rd Alabama of Cleburne's Division.

⁵ Maj. Gen. Walker was killed by a Federal sniper while he as scouting the position assigned to him near Terry's Mill Pond. 

Following the battle, Walker's Division, which had suffered terrible losses, was reassigned to other Confederate commands. Division command on the field fell to Brig. Hugh Mercer. Walker's death was a personal loss to Gen. Hood, a close friend. 

⁶ Hood ultimately blamed Hardee for the outcome of the battle, although his assertion is much disputed. In his memoirs years later he wrote, 

A considerable time had elapsed when I discovered, with astonishment and bitter disappointment, a line of battle composed of one of Hardee’s divisions advancing directly against the entrenched flank of the enemy. I at once perceived that Hardee had not only failed to turn McPherson’s left, according to positive orders, but had thrown his men against the enemy’s breastworks. Thereby occasioning unnecessary loss to us, and rendering doubtful the great result desired. In lieu of completely turning the Federal left and taking the entrenched line of the enemy in reverse, he attacked the retired wing of their flank, having his own left almost within gunshot of our main line around the city .

Historians Albert Castel and Howell and Elizabeth Purdue are some who disagree with Hood's assessment. Hood’s greatest mistake was in failing to carry out his plan for Gens. Cheatham and Stewart who would take up action as soon as Hardee became engaged. By not ordering the 2 other corps forward, Hood failed to make a coordinated attack, which was essential to success. He delayed nearly 3 hours before ordering Cheatham to attack, and Stewart's force was never committed to action.

Sources: Stonewall of the West, Craig L. Symonds; Pat Cleburne: Confederate General, Howell & Elizabeth Purdue;  Decision in the West, Albert Castel; Autumn of Glory, Thomas Lawrence Connelly; Atlanta, Jacob D. Cox; Military History of Mississippi, 1803-1898, Dunbar Rowland; Brig. Gen. Mark P. Lowrey's Autobiography; Advance and Retreat, J.B. Hood; Official Records, Vol. 38, Pts. 3 & 5

                                       _______________________________________________________________________

To view my blog about my great grandfather, Nathan Oakes, and the

32nd Mississippi Infantry Regiment in which he served in the Army of Tennessee,

please visit: http://32ndmississippi.blogspot.com

_______________________________________________________________________

The Battle of Peachtree Creek at 150

Having forced the Confederate Army of Tennessee to withdraw across the Chattahoochee River, by today's date in 1864, Gen. William T. Sherman had pushed the last of his Federal troops across the river northwest of Atlanta in pursuit. Sherman began to move his 3 armies to capture the city. He sent Gen. James B. McPherson in a wide sweep southeast to destroy the Georgia Railroad near Decatur. He sent Gen. John Schofield's army west of McPherson, and Gen. George Thomas's army west toward Peachtree Creek.

Source: House Divided

As if to complicate matters for the Confederates, their commander, Gen. Joseph E. Johnston was removed from command on the 17th and replaced by Lt. Gen. John Bell Hood. While inheriting the largest Confederate army at that time, which may have numbered nearly 63,000, Hood faced a superior force totaling 100,000 men, anxious to take Atlanta as its prize.

Hood, known for his bold fighting abilities, felt he knew just the remedy for the low morale following Johnston's removal: A battle victory at Atlanta. On today's date in 1864, he will have the opportunity to deal a significant blow to Sherman, or so he hopes.

By July 19th, Hood's battle line now had the Confederate left resting near the Pace’s Ferry Road, and the right covering Atlanta. He was informed that Sherman had divided his forces, offering Hood, in his words, "one of the most favorable occasions for complete victory which could have been offered; especially as it presented an opportunity, after crushing his right wing, to throw our entire force upon his left.” Accordingly, he planned a major, decisive attack.

Photo by Mark Dolan, June 2010

Hood held council with his corps commanders and issued orders for battle the next day. He told them that Maj. Gen. Joseph Wheeler’s cavalry would fend off federal forces approaching from the east, while Lt. Gen. William Hardee's and Maj. Gen. Alexander P. Stewart's Corps (2 divisions each) would attack Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas’s Army of the Cumberland after it crossed the Peachtree Creek. From there these 2 corps would drive Thomas along the south bank of the creek into the cul-de-sac it formed with the Chatta-hoochee River. Hardee was ordered to launch the attack, striking Thomas on his left flank. The battle was ordered to begin at 1 PM the following day.

Maj. Gen. Patrick R. Cleburne’s Division, in which Great Grandfather Nathan Oakes was serving in Brig. Gen. Mark P. Lowrey's Brigade, was to be held in reserve. At the start of the battle, his brigade was on left of the division in front of Peachtree Creek, with his left resting on the Peachtree Road, about a mile from the creek and about 4 miles from Atlanta. His men were positioned in a line of works which his brigade had built the day before.

Cleburne was to hold his 3 brigades in readiness to reinforce and exploit the anticipated breakthrough. Cleburne deployed his brigades behind Maj. Gen. William H.T. Walker’s Division, moving his artillery to the front where it could fire over the heads of the attackers and into the Federal lines.

At noon, on today's date in 1864, only an hour before the attack was to begin, Cleburne received orders to shift his position a mile to the right. Hood also ordered Cheatham to move toward his right flank where Wheeler was calling for reinforcements for help in the fight with McPherson. To avoid opening a gap in his line by these movements, Hood also ordered Hardee to move to the right to close the opening. This was a difficult move involving thousands of men, and the changes caused confusion and delay. As a result, the attack along Peachtree Creek was not only late, it ended up taking place over ground that the unit commanders had had no opportunity to examine. Consequently, the attack on Thomas's line was weak. Maj. Gen. William B. Bate, commanding Hardee’s Division on the right, never found the enemy. For Walker, directly in front of Cleburne, the delay had given the Federals an opportunity to prepare breastworks, from which he was driven back.

Photo by Mark Dolan, June 2010

A section of the picturesque Peachtree Creek today, near where the fighting
occurred. During the battle, it was a difficult muddy and marshy channel to cross.

Concerning his brigade's part in the battle Lowrey reported,

Early in the afternoon I followed the remainder of [Cleburne's] division in the trenches about one mile to the right, relieved a line of skirmishers in front of the position where I halted, and then, with the remainder of the division, moved back to our original position. The enemy having crossed Peach Tree Creek in force and advanced his lines some distance toward our works, and Granbury’s brigade having changed position and formed on my left, I advanced with the balance of the division in support of Walker’s division. My brigade was immediately in rear of Stevens’ brigade, which attacked the enemy in his works and was repulsed. After a little skirmishing with the enemy, in which I lost 2 killed, 39 wounded, and 4 captured (total 45), I was relieved by Mercer’s brigade, and again returned to my original position.

Though some other units had partial success, particularly Maj. Gen. William W. Loring’s Division of Stewart’s Corps, Hardee’s attack went nowhere. He also soon learned that Walker's attack had been repulsed. He then ordered Cleburne to commit his division to the fight. But at that moment, a order came from Hood informing him that the enemy was turning the army’s right, directing Hardee to send a division there at once. Hardee changed Cleburne’s orders and sent him instead to the right to support Wheeler and Cheatham. Of course that meant that the attack along Peachtree Creek would lose what little momentum it had. Without Cleburne’s troops, the weak attack at the creek had little chance of success. Nightfall ended the assault.

As ordered, Cleburne marched his division away from the battle, south through Atlanta, traveling along the Decatur Road. About midnight, he rested his men for a couple of hours on the edge of town along the railroad before continuing on to reinforce Wheeler's dismounted cavalry about 2 miles outside of Atlanta. They took up position outside the outer defenses in a line up the slope of Bald Hill.

By now, unable to press his attack against Thomas, Hood consequently ordered the troops to withdraw, leaving Thomas the victor at Peachtree Creek. Hood would later blame the defeat on Hardee for his lack of timeliness and boldness, when, in fact, the battle had been mismanaged by Hood.* In fact, under the circumstances, Hardee and his men seemed to do everything that could have been expected of them.

* Later in his report, Hood unjustly maligned Hardee's men, claiming claimed that the troops “did nothing more than skirmish with the enemy. Instead of charging down upon the foe as Sherman represents [in his Memoirs] Stewart’s men to have done, many of the troops, when they discovered that they had come into contact with breastworks, lay down and, consequently, this attempt at pitched battle proved abortive.”

Sources: Pat Cleburne: Confederate General, Howell & Elizabeth Purdue; The Army of Tennessee, Stanley F. Horn; Advance and Retreat, John B. Hood; Stonewall of the West, Craig L. Symonds; Autumn of Glory, Thomas Lawrence Connelly; Atlanta, Jacob. D. Cox; Military History of Mississippi, 1803-1898, Dunbar Rowland; Official Records Vol. 38, Pts. 3 & 5

                                      _______________________________________________________________________

To view my blog about my great grandfather, Nathan Oakes, and the

32nd Mississippi Infantry Regiment in which he served in the Army of Tennessee,

please visit: http://32ndmississippi.blogspot.com

_______________________________________________________________________

Repairs to battleship USS Tennessee

On today's date in 1944, the battleship USS Tennessee was received alongside my dad's repair ship, Hector, for repairs for battle damage received on June 15th (D-Day in the Pacific) from enemy shore batteries to her superstructure. Crews from Hector repaired the ship by July 15 so she could return to combat duties at Guam and Tinian.*

Commissioned in 1920, Tennessee was a Pearl Harbor survivor, having sustained 2 bomb hits and fire damage resulting from burning oil from the sunken USS Arizona. Emerging from a complete overhaul in May 1943, the ship engaged in combat operations in the Aleutians where she bombarded the island of Kiska prior to its invasion in August.

From November 1943 through September 1944, Tennessee participated in bombarding Tarawa, Kwajalein, Eniwetok, New Ireland, Saipan (where she was damaged requiring Hector's assistance on this date), Guam, Tinian, Anguar, and Pelieu. In October 1944, Tennessee supported the Battle of Leyte as U.S. invasion forces under Gen. Douglas MacArthur returned to the Philippines. She is credited with helping to sink the Japanese battleship Yamashiro in the Battle of Surigao Strait on the night of October 25.

The battleship next supported the Battle of Iwo Jima in February and March of 1945. In late March, she pounded Okinawa. Hit by a suicide plane with a bomb on April 12, Tennessee remained in action until May 1, when she went to Ulithi for repairs before returning to action at Okinawa in June. Later that year, she operated in the waters off China, and following Japan's surrender, she participated in the occupation effort before returning to the United States in early December 1946. Tennessee was decommissioned in 1947 and languished in the Reserve Fleet until she was sold for scrap in July 1959.

USS Tennessee bombarding Japanese positions on Guam, 19 July 19, 1944.
Source: Navsource.org

The USS Tennessee earned the Navy Unit Citation and 10 battle stars for combat service in World War II.

*While Hector was working on the Tennessee, it also completed 29 other repair jobs to other vessels.

Sources: USS Hector AR7- Ship’s Log (WWII); Naval History and Heritage Command; USS Tennessee War Diary, July 1944

Repairs to battleship USS California

Two and a half years after she was badly damaged and sunk by Japanese torpedoes and bombs at Pearl Harbor, the rebuilt battleship USS California reentered combat in the Pacific. One of her early tasks was to provide heavy gunfire support for the invasions of Saipan, Guam, and Tinian during June and July 1944.

On June 14, while California was bombarding Saipan, she was hit by a shell from a Japanese shore battery, killing 1 man and wounded 9. On today's date in 1944, the ship finished making her way to Eniwetok where she was received alongside my dad's ship, USS Hector, for repairs to her damaged guns. The barrels were replaced by spares from Hector and all other damage was restored by July 3. Back into action, those same guns helped clear the way for the assaults on Guam and Tinian from July 18 to August 9.

In October and November of that year, California took part in the Leyte Campaign, including the October 25th Battle of Surigao Strait, history's last fight between opposing battleships. In January 1945, California participated in the Invasion of Lingayen Gulf in the Philippines. Damaged by a kamikaze attack on January 6, she remained in action for more than 2 weeks before returning to the states for repairs and an overhaul.

California returned to the Western Pacific in June 1945, in time to take part in the final stages of the Okinawa Campaign. She covered occupation activities in the wake of Japan's surrender, then sailed for Philadelphia in December 1945. The USS California was decommissioned in February 1947 and sold for scrap in 1959.

USS California, 1945
Source: reocities.com

Launched in 1919, this venerable flagship of the Pacific earned 7 battle stars for her World War II service.

Sources: Naval Historical Center; USS California War Diary June & July 1944

The Battle of Kennesaw Mountain at 150

Source: Civil War Maps by Hal Jesperson

Confederate Gen. Joseph Johnston had carefully arranged his Army of Tennessee in a strong position near Marietta, Georgia, on and around Kennesaw Mountain, awaiting a general attack by Gen. William T. Sherman's Federal army. On today's date in 1864, the 2 armies again clashed, this time in the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain.

Sherman, who had been attacking and pushing the Confederates south from Dalton since early May, had at last decided to bring on a large-scale frontal attack on the Confederate line. His overall plan was to break through simultaneously at 2 points where he considered the Rebel line vulnerable, thereby preventing one part of Johnston's line from reinforcing the other.

Sherman ordered Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield to move his army to the right in the hopes that Johnston would be forced to weaken his line by extending it accordingly. Then he was to attack the Confederate left flank near the Powder Springs Road. His plan for Maj. Gen. James B. McPherson was for his army to make a demonstration on his extreme left to the north of Marietta and the northeastern end of Kennesaw Mountain, while making a major attack on the southwestern end of Little Kennesaw Mountain. At the same time, Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas was to make the main assault against the Confederate fortifications in the center of their line.

Thomas had the unfortunate task of attacking 2 hardened veteran Confederate divisions of Lt. Gen. William Hardee's Corps—Maj. Gens. Benjamin Cheatham's and Patrick R. Cleburne's. My great grandfather, Pvt. Nathan R. Oakes, was in Brig. Gen. Mark Lowrey's Brigade in Cleburne's Division, and would be one of the units to receive the force of Thomas's attack.

Photo by Mark Dolan, June 2010

These 2 divisions were extended in a single line along a 3-mile rise, now known as Cheatham Hill. Cheatham's Division was posted on the left, with Cleburne's Division assigned to his right, extending to the Dallas Road. Lowery's Brigade was on the left, next to Chatham's Division, Gen. Daniel Govan's in the center, and Gen. Hiram Granbury's on the right. The men had fortified themselves behind a series of strong breastworks. The Federal line was 400 yards away across a small ravine. In front of Lowrey's men were open woods and dense undergrowth, while Govan's troops fronted a field with felled timber scattered on their left.

By 8 AM, Cleburne's men could see the enemy across the Federal line marching and massing behind their breastworks, readying for an attack. At 8:45, the Federals opened with a fierce artillery barrage. At 9:00, Federal soldiers directed their attack against Cheatham's and Cleburne's line. They were arranged in 2 massed columns, 5 lines deep, with a strong line of skirmishers in the front. Throughout the day, 8,000 Federals would attack the center of the Confederate defenses, aiming much of the attack toward the prominent salient on the south end of Cheatham's line.¹

In Cleburne's front, his men held their fire until the enemy was within 75 yards of their defenses. Pouring sustained fire into the ranks of the approaching enemy, the Rebels turned back the advancing wave of bluecoats. At one point, under close fire of the enemy, the bold Gen. Mark Lowrey jumped on the breastworks and moved down his line encouraging his men.

Photo by Mark Dolan, June 2010

Confederate cannon near Lowrey's men, covering

the direction of the Federal approach

The temperature through the day rose to 100 degrees. And the dense woods and thick undergrowth made forward movement toward the Confederate line even more difficult. In some places, exploding shells caused fires to erupt. Flames spread quickly, and many of the Federal wounded were engulfed in the inferno. Unable to watch the horrible scene, one of Cleburne's men, Lt. Col. William Martin, jumped upon the breastworks and waved a white handkerchief as a flag of truce. Immediately, there was a ceasefire while Yankees and Cleburne's men ran forward from their lines to assist the wounded and beat out the flames. The next day, the Union commanders presented the colonel with a matching pair of ivory-handled pistols in gratitude for his action.

After the brief truce, the fighting resumed.² There was another Federal charge against Cleburne's line, but the Confederates drove it back. Unable to pierce the Rebel line, within a half hour, the last attack was called off. A thousand Federal soldiers were killed on Cheatham Hill. Cleburne's losses were only 2 killed and 9 wounded. Cheatham lost 194.

To the east, as at Cheatham Hill, the battle did not go well for Sherman. Except for some success in Schofield's front, the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain was a tactical defeat for his army. 6,000 soldiers on both sides lost their lives on this day. Sherman's losses were 3 casualties for every 1 in Johnston's army. In front of Cleburne's men, the Federal loss was more than 9 to 1. The battle would be Sherman's last attempt at a major frontal assault against a fortified position. Going forward, Sherman will return to his flanking strategy. He will move part of his army around Johnston, forcing the Confederates to withdraw. The Battle of Kennesaw Mountain is judged a failure for Sherman, who squandered his numerical superiority and the courage of his soldiers.³  

For Johnston and his Confederates, the Battle of Kennesaw was the most clear-cut victories in the Atlanta campaign. However, the victory brought little actual advantage for the Southerners. Sherman continued to be well supplied by his rail line, and his force remained large and able to absorb his loss. Johnston was soon to recognize that while victorious in this battle, his strategic situation remained the same. Indeed, his line was stretched dangerously thin. He soon learned that some of Sherman's force had pushed beyond his left flank and was actually closer to the Chattahoochee River than his own army, thus potentially threatening his connection to Atlanta. So, on the night of July 2nd, he will withdraw his army from the Kennesaw line.

Within 5 days, Sherman will be ready to advance again upon Johnston's army.

Photo by Mark Dolan, June 2010

Illinois Monument at "Dead Angle" on Cheatham Hill
Desperate Illinois men who made it to within 20 yards of the Rebel line, tried
unsuccessfully to dig a tunnel to blow up the Rebel entrenchments above them.

¹  Gen. Cheatham's men held the south end of the hill and the salient which extended outwards toward the advancing enemy. Wave after wave of Federals advance towards the salient on Cheatham's line. Relentless gunfire killed hundreds of Federal troops, most from Illinois. Incredibly, their leader, Brig. Gen. Daniel McCook, and some of his men made it up the hill to the Rebel line, only to be killed or captured. McCook was one of those mortally wounded here (397 from his brigade were lost). Later, because of the ferocity and tremendous loss of life, both sides would refer to this salient as “The Dead Angle," by which name it still is known today.
² On June 30th, men from both armies joined to remove the dead. Bodies that had lain exposed for 3 days were buried in trenches. Men were forbidden to rifle the dead. When they were finished, men from both sides chatted, exchanged newspapers, and traded for coffee and tobacco. By late afternoon, many of the men shook hands, wishing each other "good luck" before returning to their respective trenches. Along some parts of the battle line opposing pickets reached an agreement not to shoot at each other, although that night musketry and artillery fire erupted along Cheatham's and Cleburne's line.
³ Sherman barely mentioned the sacrifices of his own men in the battle. However, in Gen. Johnston's postwar memoirs he freely acknowledged the courage of the Federal troops who attacked his line in the battle: "The characteristic fortitude of the northwestern soldiers held them under a close and destructive fire long after reasonable hope of success was gone.” 

Sources: Patrick Cleburne: Confederate General, Howell & Elizabeth Purdue; Decision in the West, Albert Castel; The Army of Tennessee, Stanley F. Horn; A Light on a Hill, Robbie Neal Sumrall; War So Terrible, James Lee McDonough & James Pickett Jones; Narrative of Military Operations During the Civil War, Joseph E. Johnston; Official Records, Vol. 38, Pt. 1

                                       _______________________________________________________________________

To view my blog about my great grandfather, Nathan Oakes, and the

32nd Mississippi Infantry Regiment in which he served in the Army of Tennessee,

please visit: http://32ndmississippi.blogspot.com

_______________________________________________________________________

Emergency repairs to USS Saranac

On today's date in 1944, the fleet oiler, USS Saranac, was received alongside my dad's repair ship, USS Hector, at Eniwetok for emergency battle damage work.

Saranac had been refueling carriers 30 miles east of Saipan when on June 18th, she and 2 other oilers in her group were attacked by Japanese aircraft. Saranac was hit by a bomb in her after superstructure deck, and her sick bay and engine room also were badly damaged. Tragically, 9 men were lost and 21 were wounded. The next day the stricken ship limped under her own power toward Eniwetok, all the while under enemy observation.

Crews from Hector worked in double shifts fully intending to complete Saranac's repairs. However, after the repair work was well underway, the Saranac received orders to return to the states for permanent repairs. Hector's crews then turned their attention to repairing the ship's power plant, enabling her to sail under her own power on July 2nd.

USS Saranac, near Mare Island, June 20, 1944
Source: Shipscribe.com

After her stateside repairs, Saranac rejoined the war in the Pacific. She supported the naval action in the Battle of Leyte starting in October 1944, the invasion of Okinawa in April 1945, and through the end of that year she refueled ships in the South China Sea. At the end of the war, Saranac was converted to a floating power barge for military installations in the Pacific. Finally, she was struck from the Naval Vessel Register in 1956, and a year later was sold to a private corporation.

For her distinguished World War II service the USS Saranac received 5 battle stars.

Sources: USS Hector AR7- Ship’s Log (WWII); USS Saranac War Diary, June & July 1944

The Battle of the Philippine Sea, 1944

The Naval Battle of the Philippine Sea, June 19–20, 1944, a major carrier engagement with the Japanese Imperial Navy, took place during the U.S. amphibious invasion of Saipan and Mariana Islands. It was the greatest carrier battle in history.

Japan regarded the Marianas, including Saipan, Guam, and Tinian, as part of her homeland in addition to being integral to her inner defense perimeter. Its land-based fighter and bomber aircraft on these islands controlled the sea lanes to Japan and protected the home islands. However, in late 1943 Japan's outer defensive ring was overrun at the costly Battle of Tarawa, and in early 1944, the U.S. fleet had pressed on through the Marshall Islands sweeping across other islands in the Central Pacific. For the Americans, control of the Marianas would put the Japanese homeland within range of American bombers. An attack on  the Marianas, however, inevitably would bring on a naval battle with the Japanese.

From June 13-15, 1944, U.S. carriers began a series of air strikes on the Marianas, convincing the Japanese that the Americans were preparing to invade. This move came as a surprise to the Japanese as they had expected the next U.S. target to be farther to the south, either the Carolines or the Palaus. This belief led to their fortification of these islands with less preparation given to the possibility of a Marianas invasion. Saipan D-day came on June 15 when American Marines invaded in an amphibious landing.

The Japanese immediately ordered a counterattack by sea, committing nearly all of its serviceable ships to the engagement. Their force consisted of 9 carriers and 5 battleships. Their plan was to bring on a decisive battle while their ground forces on Saipan fought off the American invasion.

Battle of the Philippine Sea, June 19-20, 1944
Source: Wikimedia Commons

On today's date in 1944, the Japanese began their air attack against the U.S. Navy's Fifth Fleet. They launched 4 separate raids. In what is remembered by American sailors and airmen as the first day of the "Marianas Turkey Shoot," the Japanese lost more than 240 planes, the Americans only 30. Damage to American ships was also minimal, with damaged battleship, USS South Dakota, able to remain in the fight. Two American submarines, the Albacore and Cavalla, each sunk an enemy carrier.

The next day, with only about 200 aircraft left, the Japanese continued their attacks. By the afternoon, the Americans had verified the Japanese fleet's position and launched an all-out attack of their own. Approaching the enemy's ships, the American pilots encountered intense antiaircraft fire. Nevertheless, they were able to press their attack, sinking another carrier and damaging 2 more, along with a battleship. Japanese naval power had suffered irreparable damage.

The return trip for the American pilots was a harrowing experience. The distance involved required most of the aircraft to run dangerously low on fuel, while nighttime had fallen. Carriers were illuminated to help the returning pilots find their way, despite the risk of enemy submarine and air attacks. Eighty of the returning planes were lost, some crashing on flight decks, while the majority went into the sea. Thankfully, most of their crews were rescued over the next few days.

Overnight, the Japanese fleet withdrew. By the battle's conclusion, the Japanese had lost 3 carriers, 2 oilers, and more than 600 carrier- and land-based aircraft. As much as 90% of the Japanese carrier aviation force was destroyed in 2 days. The Americans lost 123 aircraft and some damage to ships. Amazingly, only 16 pilots and 33 aircrew remained missing by the end of the engagement.

So decisive was the Battle of the Philippine Sea for the Americans that it eliminated the Imperial Japanese Navy's ability to conduct large-scale carrier actions for the remainder of the war. In that battle the Japanese Navy lost the majority of its carrier air strength.  It would never recover.

Source: The Two-Ocean War, Samuel Eliot Morrison